Loading...

Category: Insights

Providing Notice: Marking your Intellectual Property

Marla Garland, and Elliot J. Shine[1]

December 9, 2019


Summary

Owners of intellectual property (“IP”) such as trademarks, copyrights or patents, can benefit from providing public notice of their claimed IP. This article will briefly describe aspects of the legal framework for providing notice and what the benefits are in doing so. For more information, and to learn how laws on marking may affect your own particular circumstances, please contact an experienced attorney.

Patent Marking


Patent Pending


Patent Pending

Use of “Patent Pending” alerts the public that your article may soon be protected by patent and once a patent is issued, that the patent owner has the right to initiate a patent infringement lawsuit and seek monetary damages. An applicant may only mark an article with “Patent Pending” after filing a provisional or nonprovisional patent application. Improper use of “Patent Pending” can result in significant penalties and consultation with an experienced patent attorney is recommended before marking your products.

Issued Patents


Patent owners should inform the public that a product is patented by “marking,” i.e., providing certain information about the patent(s) on the article or its packaging. See 35 U.S.C. §287(a). This serves to identify to the public whether an article is patented,[2] and potentially allowing enhanced damages for willful infringement.

Patent marking follows strict formalities.[3] The product must be marked with the term “Patent” or “Pat.” followed by the specific patent number. These marking must be substantially consistent and continuous in order to provide constructive notice to the public, that is, one should mark substantially all products manufactured; and the marking should be continuous over time.

In keeping with the advent of e-commerce, the “American Invents Act” (AIA) provides for virtual marking. Virtual marking requires the article be marked with either “Patent” or “Pat.” and instead is followed with an Internet (URL) address that associates the patented product with the patent registration numbers. This is helpful to save costs for manufacturers and to facilitate effective marking of small products.

If the article is of a size or has characteristics that prevent the patent owner from placing the required information on the article itself, the patentee may instead mark the article by fixing it or to its package a label containing the information.[4] In short, if it is possible to mark the product, then it should be marked.[5]


Trademark Marking


® TM SM


Unregistered Trademark

Unlike the requirements to mark an article with “Patent Pending” a prospective trademark applicant may use terms such as “trademark,” trademark applied for,” and “TM” regardless of whether the mark is registered or has been applied for. Similarly, the “SM” symbol can be used without registration to represent services.  Both the “TM” and “SM” symbols indicate a users intent to move forward with obtaining a legal trademark and alert competitors of intent to use the mark for the users business.

Registered Trademark

Once registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), a trademark owner may give notice that the mark is registered by displaying with the mark the words “Registered in United States Patent and Trademark Office,” or the abbreviation “Reg. U.S. Pat. & Tm. Off.,” or the letter R enclosed within a circle, ®. If the mark is pending, the registration symbol may not be used.

The registration symbol should be used as a subscript directly after the mark wherever that term appears as a trademark, and particularly on packaging and in publications and printed material. If use of the registration symbol becomes cumbersome, the registration symbol should appear with the mark at least once per page in copy at the most prominent use of the mark, such as in the headline or caption.

Copyright Notice


©


Copyright notice should be provided with any creative work that is published. Once an individual or author creates a copyrightable work, a “copy right” automatically inures to the benefit of the author. Although notice is not required for marks published after March 1, 1989, notice should still be provided.  Registration of ones copyright with the U.S. Copyright Office must be made before one can file an action of copyright infringement.

An effective copyright notice, whether registered or unregistered, should include three elements that can appear as a single continuous statement:

  • The copyright symbol © (or for phonorecords, the symbol ℗); the word “copyright”; or the abbreviation “copr.”;
  • The year of first publication of the work; and
  • The name of the copyright owner

Example: © 2017 John Doe[6]

Notice is optional for works published after March 1, 1989. However, providing a copyright notice carries certain benefits, such as:

  • Allowing potential licensees to contact the copyright owner and negotiate a license agreement.
  • Possibly preventing a defendant in a copyright infringement action from attempting to limit his or her liability for damages or injunctive relief based on an innocent infringement defense.
  • Identifying the year of first publication, which may be used to determine the term of copyright protection in the case of an anonymous work, pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire.

Conclusion

Business owners understand the need to carve out a place for their business to operate, thrive and grow, and business owners appreciate the use of intellectual property to protect their competitiveness. Owners of intellectual property can stand to enjoy significant legal benefits if they properly provide notice of their claimed IP. Alternatively, improper notice can involve significant consequences.

This article is only a brief overview of IP marking and was prepared for general informational purposes only. For further information, or any questions regarding intellectual property law, you may call our firm at (212) 681-0800, or e-mail us at info@wyattip.com.


[1] The information contained in this article does not constitute legal advice or legal opinion, but has been prepared for general informational purposes only. Any opinions expressed in this article shall not be construed to represent the legal opinion of this firm, its attorneys of any of its clients. The receipt of this article does not create an attorney-client relationship and may constitute attorney advertising. © 2019 Wyatt & Associates

[2] See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1998). (“The marking statute serves three related purposes: 1) helping to avoid innocent infringement, 2) encouraging patentees to give notice to the public that the article is patented, and 3) aiding the public to identify whether an article is patented.”).

[3] See, 35 U.S.C. §287(a) (2012).

[4] See, Id.

[5] See, Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 751, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 96 F.3d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1996). (“[T]he evidence shows that the patent mark was put in literature describing the Omniflex, which was then freely distributed to surgeons, nurses, hospital personnel, and anyone that asked for them, separately from the Omniflex devices themselves. This type of constructive notice is insufficient under the statute, as a matter of law.”). 

[6] See Copyright Notice, Cir. 3 (2017), available at https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ03.pdf (Accessed Nov. 18, 2019).

Waymo and Uber Meet at the Crossroads of Intellectual Property: A Classic Controversy Involving Trade Secrets

Gabrielle B. Carusello[1]

It’s no secret that Uber Technologies, Inc. has been experiencing hardship in the news for the majority of 2016 and the hits just keep on coming.  Uber has experienced unrelenting exposure in the media, with reports of a high-profile public boycott, sexism at the company, the use of secret software to elude law enforcement, and the leaked video showing Uber’s CEO Travis Kalanick arguing with an Uber driver.[2]  But, the 70 billion dollar company may not be able to make it out of its latest public embarrassment.[3]  One reporter predicts that this lawsuit against Uber, filed in the Northern District of California, by Waymo LLC (an entity of Alphabet Inc., parent company of Google) “is poised to be among the biggest legal fights over intellectual property so far this century.”[4]

WAYMO FIGHTS FOR ITS RIGHT TO DRIVE OUT THE COMPETITION

Waymo, a name given to Google’s self-driving car project, uses LiDAR as part of its self-driving technology.  LiDAR, which stands for Light Detection and Ranging, is a “remote sensing method used to examine the surface of the Earth.”[5]  Waymo LLC learned that Uber was also using LiDAR technology for its self-driving car project when a LiDAR vendor for both Waymo and Uber accidentally copied Waymo on an e-mail.  That e-mail included attachments of machine drawings of an Uber LiDAR circuit board.[6]  (Pro-Tip: please double-check your e-mail before sending confidential information!)

On February 23, 2017, Waymo LLC filed suit against Uber in the Northern District Court of California for “trade secret misappropriation, patent infringement, and unfair competition relating to Waymo’s self-driving car technology.”[7]  In its complaint, Waymo alleged that the “circuit board bears a striking resemblance to Waymo’s own highly confidential and proprietary design and reflects Waymo trade secrets.”[8]  If Waymo’s allegations against the defendants, Uber Technologies, Ottomotto LLC, and Otto Trucking LLC are further developed in court and are true, these companies could be liable for breaking not only federal and state civil laws, but federal criminal laws as well.

Anthony Levandowski, a former Google manager who worked on the Waymo self-driving car project, is at the center of the Waymo v. Uber lawsuit.  Waymo accused Levandowski of downloading more than 14,000 highly confidential documents containing self-driving technology, said to be proprietary, from the Google servers and used the misappropriated information to start his own company, Otto Trucking.[9]  It is alleged that two months after these documents were taken, Levandowski resigned without notice.[10]  Further, it is alleged that a number of Waymo employees “subsequently also left to join Anthony Levandowski’s new business, downloading additional Waymo trade secrets in the days and hours prior to their departure.”[11]  In addition, the information included Waymo’s “confidential supplier lists, manufacturing details and statements of work with highly technical information, all of which reflected the results of Waymo’s months-long, resource-intensive research into suppliers for highly specialized LiDAR sensor components.”[12]  Waymo further alleges that, coincidentally, in August 2016, Uber bought Otto for $680 million and hired Levandowski onto Uber’s self-driving team.[13]

COPYING MAY BE SINCERE FLATTERY, BUT IS NOT ALWAYS APPRECIATED

The terms “misappropriation” and “trade secret,” which are referred to throughout the Waymo v. Uber controversy, relate to a property right recognized by common law and federal law.

The U.S. Code  provides:

(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner  thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly— (1) steals, or without authorization appropriates takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information;  (2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information; (3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; (4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.[14]

On the state level, California has adopted the United States Uniform Trade Secrets Act[15] under California Civil Code section 3426.1, which has been invoked in the Waymo case.  Of particular interest is the definition of trade secrets:

information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.[16]

For comparison, New York takes a different approach when it comes to trade secret protection. As one court has broadly stated, a trade secret is any:

formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one’s business, and which gives [the employer] an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.[17]

The body of law outlined above provides insight as to what legal provisions for misappropriation of trade secrets may be applied. However, in trade secret cases, rarely can one prove misappropriation by direct evidence and one must often draw inferences and rely upon the overall weight of circumstantial evidence.   If Waymo is able to provide convincing evidence that its private documents were applied to Uber’s circuit boards as the basis of Uber’s self-driving unit, then Uber may be in trouble at both the federal and state level.

PRELIMINARY INJUNTION: A FIRST SIGN OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

Presiding at the District Court, Judge Alsup was persuaded that the evidence Waymo provided was sufficient to partially grant and partially deny a preliminary injunction against Uber.[18]   In the preliminary injunction hearing, Judge Alsup stated:

[y]ou don’t get many cases where there is pretty direct proof that somebody downloaded 14,000 documents, and then left the next day.[19]  Waymo has also sufficiently shown…that the 14,000-plus purloined files likely contain at least some trade secrets.[20]

Uber does not dispute the allegation that Levandowski obtained 14,000 files from Waymo, but rather Uber maintains that “Waymo’s files never crossed over into Uber’s servers or devices and that ‘Uber took strict precautions to ensure that no trade secrets belonging to a former employer would be brought to or used at Uber.’”[21]  The Court stated these denials:

leave open the danger of all manner of mischief…it remains entirely possible that Uber knowingly left Levandowski free to keep that treasure trove of files as handy as he wished (so long as he kept it on his own personal devices), and that Uber willfully refused to tell Levandowski to return the treasure trove to its rightful owner. At best (and this has not been shown), Uber may have required Levandowski, as a matter of form, to commit not to use the Waymo files.[22]

On May 15, 2017, Judge Alsup partially granted Waymo’s preliminary injunction on the showing by Waymo of likely success on the merits.  However, the transcript of the proceedings remains under seal until August 2017.  Moreover, the Court also went so far as to refer the matter to the United States Attorney General for investigation of possible theft of trade secrets.[23]  The injunction “mainly prohibits Levandowski from working on Uber’s LiDAR- a measure Uber has very recently implemented of its own initiative, so the hardship on the defendants will be minimal.”[24]  The potential criminal charge did not stay the Court’s hand when deciding on the motion for preliminary injunction proceedings:

if you think for a moment that I’m going to stay my hand, because your guy [Anthony Levandowski] is taking the Fifth Amendment, and not issue a preliminary injunction to shut down what happened here, you’re wrong. This is a very serious — now, some of the things in your motion are bogus. You’ve got things in there like lists of suppliers as  trade secrets. Come on. It undermines the whole thing. But there are some things in that motion that are very serious. They are genuine trade   secrets. And if you don’t come in with a denial, you’re probably looking   at a preliminary injunction.[25]

Further, the Court stated that Uber did not deny the allegation that trade secrets were misappropriated by Levandowski. The Court, along with Waymo, questioned whether or not Uber knew that Levandowski unlawfully took proprietary documents from the moment that Uber purchased Otto Trucking, LLC.[26]  In the order, the Court states that, “Waymo has supplied a compelling evidentiary record that Levandowski resigned without prior notice from his position at Waymo under highly suspicious circumstances…”[27]

Waymo has shown “at least serious questions going to the merits as to whether Uber’s adoption of [the technology] used by Waymo resulted from old-fashioned, all-American misappropriation of trade secrets.”[28]  However, the preliminary injunction was denied in part because some of the technologies that Waymo claimed to be trade secrets were deemed too general, namely “general engineering principles that are simply part of the intellectual equipment of technical employees.”[29]  Nevertheless, the Court pointed out in support of the injunction:

Levandowski remains in possession of over 14,000 confidential files from Waymo, at least some of which likely contain Waymo’s trade secrets. Misuse of that treasure trove remains an ever-present danger wholly at his whim. Under these circumstances, the harm that Waymo is likely to suffer as a result of such misuse cannot be unwound after the fact, nor can it be adequately compensated for with monetary damages.[30]

While we await public disclosure of the record to understand the whole story, commentators are left to speculate.

The inevitable disclosure doctrine and laws enacted by Congress under the Economic Espionage Act, may provide an additional basis for relief on behalf of Google. While some jurisdictions follow the “inevitable disclosure doctrine,”[31] which allows a plaintiff to “prove a claim of trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead him to rely on plaintiff’s trade secrets,”[32] California does not officially follow this theory of tort. Nonetheless, under the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), courts are allowed “to enjoin an employee from working for his employer’s competitors because of the threat of misappropriation.”[33] This section of CUTSA could be particularly useful to Waymo since Anthony Levandowski has chosen to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and Waymo has been unable to search his personal laptop, or even question him about the misappropriation of Waymo’s files.[34]  However, CUTSA states:

actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined. Upon application to the court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunction may be continued for an additional period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.[35]

The likelihood of a permanent injunction, however, is heavily reliant on whether Waymo can provide convincing evidence at trial.  Waymo will need to be able to provide evidence of irreparable harm, show the balance of harm favors Waymo, demonstrate that Waymo has a likelihood of success on the merits of the case, and establish that public interest favors the granting of a permanent injunction.[36] Should this case be investigated by the United States Attorney General in the coming weeks, the Economic Espionage Act, enacted and proscribed by the U.S. Code, could be applied to Levandowski with criminal ramifications.[37]

While in the past, it was believed that one could hide evidence of misconduct and destroy one’s paper trail by shredding documents, now with the advancement of technology and the digital age, there is also a belief that one can likewise delete files and data to hide one’s tracks. However, neither method provides a clean getaway. The District Court found a classic case of misappropriation of trade secrets with the absence of 14,000 documents, but there is plenty left to be decided in this controversy by following the electronic footprints of these documents. The outcome of this case may ultimately be determined by the additional discovery that may be brought forth by either Waymo’s lawyers or the Attorney General, and if so, it could be the end of a tumultuous ride for Uber.[38]

 

[1]  The information contained in this article does not constitute legal advice or legal opinion, but has been prepared for general informational purposes only. Any opinions expressed in this article shall not be construed to represent the legal opinion of this firm, its attorneys or any of its clients. The receipt of this article does not create an attorney-client relationship. ©2017 Wyatt & Associates, LLP

[2]  LaFrance, Adrienne, Travis Kalanick is Taking a Break from Uber, The Atlantic, June 13 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/everything-you-need-to-know-about-driverless-cars-a-cribsheet/518847/.

[3]  Id.

[4]  Id.

[5]  National Ocean Service, What is LIDAR?, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/lidar.html, (last visited July 18, 2017).

[6]  See Complaint at 3, Waymo, LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00939 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 23, 2017).

[7]  See id at 2. (Waymo also brought claims for violation of California Business and Professional Code Section 17200).

[8]  Waymo, LLC, N.D. Cal., Complaint at 3.

[9]  See id.

[10]  See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Provisional Relief at 2, Waymo, LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00939 (N.D. Cal. filed May 15, 2017).

[11]  Waymo, LLC, N.D. Cal., Complaint at 4.

[12]  Id.

[13]  Waymo, LLC, N.D. Cal., Order at 4.

[14]  U.S.C.§ 1832 (a)(2016); see also U.S.C § 1832 (b) (“Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than the greater of $5,000,000 or 3 times the value of the stolen trade secret to the organization, including expenses for research and design and other costs of reproducing the trade secret that the organization has thereby avoided”).

[15]  CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (d)(1985).

[16]  U.T.S.A § 1.4 (1986); see also U.T.S.A. § 1.2 (1986)…(Misappropriation is defined as “(i) the acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or implied consent by a person who (A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or (B) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had  reason to  know  that his knowledge of  the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (II) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) before a marital change of his [or her] position, knew or had reason to know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired by accident or mistake”).

[17]  Ashland Mgt. v. Janien, 82 N.Y.2d 395, 407 (1993). New York uses a six factor test to determine misappropriation of trade secrets: “1. the extent to which the information is known outside of [the] business; 2. the extent to which it is known by the employees and others involved in [the] business; 3. the extent of measures taken by [the business] to guard the secrecy of the information; 4. the value of the information to [the business] and [its] competitors; 5. the amount of effort or money expended by [the business] in developing the information; 6. the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others”); See also Restatement (First) of Torts § 757 (1939).

[18]  Waymo, LLC, N.D. Cal., Order at 2.

[19]  See Document 63 at 20, Waymo, LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00939 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 23, 2017) (Transcript of Proceedings on Thursday, March 16, 2017).

[20]  Waymo, LLC, N.D. Cal., Order at 2. (Emphasis in Original).

[21]  See id at 8.

[22]  Id. (Emphasis in Original).

[23]  See Order of Referral to United States Attorney at 1, Waymo, LLC v. Uber Technologies, Inc., C-17-00939 WHA (N.D. Cal. filed May 11, 2017).

[24]  Waymo, LLC, N.D. Cal., Order at 22.

[25]  See Document 131 at 7, Waymo LLC v. Uber Technologies Inc., No. 00939 (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 23, 2017).

[26]  Waymo, LLC, N.D. Cal., Order at 7.

[27]  See id at 2.

[28]  See id at 15.

[29]  Id.

[30]  See id at 20.

[31]  Les Concierges Inc. v. Robeson, No. 09-1510, 2009 WL 1138561, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2009).

[32]  PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). See also Molon Motor & Coil Corp. v. Nidec Motor Corp., No. 16-cv-03545, (N.D. Ill. filed May 11, 2017).

[33]  C.U.T.S.A. § 3426.2 (a)(1984).

[34]  Waymo, LLC, N.D. Cal., Order at 6.

[35]  C.U.T.S.A. § 3426.2 (a)(1984).

[36]  Waymo, LLC, N.D. Cal., Order at 11-21.

[37]  U.S.C.§ 1831 (2013); (“(a) whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly— (1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret; (2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret; (3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; (4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3); or (5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy shall [be punished], except as provided in subsection (b), be fined not more than $5,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both; and that any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not more than the greater of $10,000,000 or 3 times the value of the stolen trade secret to the organization, including expenses for research and design and other costs of reproducing the trade secret that the organization has thereby avoided”); see also U.S.C.§ 1831 (5)(b).

[38]  For further information, or any questions regarding intellectual property law and trade secrets, you may call our firm at (212) 681-0800, or e-mail us at info@wyattip.com.

WARNING: Non-USPTO Trademark Solicitations That May Mislead You

Kimberly R. Endelson[1]

If you receive a letter or invoice claiming that you may owe money in connection with your trademark, it may be fraudulent.  Various parties have been sending communications that give the impression they are official notices from the United States Patent and Trademark Office requesting fees and/or money for services.  These letters may state or imply that the matter is urgent and immediate action is required else you could lose your rights.  Since the information included in your trademark application for registration is listed publicly through the USPTO’s website, USPTO.gov, such groups may be using your information in an attempt to mislead you.

Some letters may include offers “(1) for legal services; (2) for trademark monitoring services; (3) to record trademarks with U.S. Customs and Border Protection; and (4) to ‘register’ trademarks in the company’s own private registry,”[2] among other things.  In an attempt to appear as an official government notice, the letters may use names resembling that of the USPTO and terms such as “United States,” “US,” “Trademark,” “Patent,” “Registration,” “Office” or “Agency.”[3]  The letters may also try to mimic the appearance of an official notice from the USPTO.

Here are some tips for discerning whether you have received an official or unofficial communication from the USPTO:

  1. Read the letter carefully, including the fine print, because the letter may state that the render of the letter has no affiliation with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. The letter may also describe the services you will receive after payment, which may be unnecessary for the registration and/or maintenance of your mark.
  2. Visit the following link from the USPTO’s website to see if the letter or invoice you received looks like one the list of non-USPTO solicitations: https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/non-uspto-solicitations.[4]
  3. “All official correspondence will be from the ‘United States Patent and Trademark Office’ in Alexandria, VA, and if by e-mail, specifically from the domain ‘@uspto.gov.’”[5]

If you have received a letter or invoice and are still questioning whether it is an official notice, contact the United States Patent and Trademark Office directly by calling (800) 786-9199 or by e-mailing usptoinfo@uspto.gov.  For further information, you may call our firm at (212) 681-0800 or e-mail us at info@WyattIP.com.

[1] The information contained in this article does not constitute legal advice or legal opinion, but has been prepared for general informational purposes only. Any opinions expressed in this article shall not be construed to represent the legal opinion of this firm, its attorneys or any of its clients. The receipt of this article does not create an attorney-client relationship. ©2016 Wyatt & Associates, LLP

[2] USPTO.gov, Warning: Non-USPTO Solicitations That May Resemble Official USPTO Communications, https://www.uspto.gov/trademarks-getting-started/non-uspto-solicitations (last visited Feb. 22, 2017).

[3] Id.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

The Enfish Case for Technology-Based Business Methods and Process Patents

Christina Y. K. Kwok[1]

Introduction

The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have long grappled with the scope of patent eligibility, especially with the patent eligibility of so-called “business methods”.

Previously, the Supreme Court in Mayo reversed a Court of Appeal’s decision and held patent claims invalid for claiming underlying laws of nature.[2]  Later in Alice, the Court reaffirmed its precedent on the patent-ineligibility of merely abstract ideas, specifically, that “if a patent’s recitation of a computer amounts to mere instruction to ‘implement’ an abstract idea ‘on…a computer,’ that addition cannot impart patent eligibility.”[3]  These two Supreme Court cases established the Mayo/Alice test for determining the scope of patent eligible claims.  The Court did, however, leave open some questions of the patent eligibility of technological improvements and business methods by suggesting that “claims ‘purport[ing] to improve the functioning of the computer itself,’ or ‘improv[ing] and existing technological process’ might not succumb to the abstract idea exception.”[4]

Recently, however, the Court of Appeals appears to have resolved the uncertainty, considering whether certain software improvements can be patent eligible inventions and, if so, what guidelines would help determine the scope of patent eligibility.  In Enfish v. Microsoft, the Court of Appeals re-confirmed the Mayo/Alice test, and went a step further by clarifying the scope of patent eligible subject matter.

Enfish v. Microsoft

In 2012, Enfish, LLC sued Microsoft Corporation for infringement of two Enfish patents.[5]   Enfish alleged that Microsoft’s ADO.NET infringed Enfish’s patents for a “self-referential” database because ADO.NET’s interface “creates and manipulates self-referential tables as part of its operation.”[6]  Microsoft®[7] countered alleging that Enfish’s patents claims were invalid.

One notable claim at issue, claim 17 of the ‘775 Enfish patent, reads:

A data storage and retrieval system for a computer having a memory, a central processing unit and a display, comprising: means for configuring said memory according to a logical table, said logical table including: a plurality of cells, each said cell having a first address segment and a second address segment; a plurality of records, each said attribute set including a series of cells having the same second address segment, each said attribute set including an object identification number (OID) to identify each said attribute set; a plurality of records, each said record including a series of cells having the same first address segment, each said record including an OID to identify each said record; and means for indexing data stored in said table.[8]

The United States District Court for the Central District of California found all Enfish patent claims ineligible under 35 U.S.C. §101.[9]  On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s summary judgment in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part.[10]

Court of Appeals Analysis

In its analysis, the Court of Appeals refused to read Alice “so broadly,” stating there is “no reason to conclude that all claims directed to improvements in computer-related technology, including those directed to software, are abstract…”.[11]  The Court of Appeals noted the Supreme Court had stated that “an invention is not rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept” and that previous attempts to patent software were thwarted because the “claims at issue amount[ed] to ‘nothing significantly more’ than an instruction to apply the abstract idea…using some unspecified, generic computer.”[12]  In its opinion, the court asserted that “[s]oftware can make non-abstract improvements to computer technology just as hardware improvements can, and sometimes the improvements can be accomplished through either route.”[13]  It concluded that a majority of computer-related technology should not automatically be categorized as “abstract” and pushed aside in step one of the Mayo/Alice test, while only a few passing this hurdle may be considered in step two of the Mayo/Alice test.[14]

The existing Mayo/Alice test that the court had applied is a two-step test for patent eligibility established by the Supreme Court.  The first step is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.”[15]  The step one inquiry is to filter claims, “in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.’” [16] If the claims do not pass the first inquiry, or fall into one of the categories of “abstract ideas,” then step two is to “consider the elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application” and do not remain abstract ideas.[17]

The Court of Appeals ultimately resolved whether to apply step one or step two of the Mayo/Alice test to the Enfish claims by asking “whether the focus of the claims is on specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities (ie., the self-referential table for a computer database) or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.”[18]

After a close examination of claim 17 of the ‘604 patent and the district court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals concluded that certain of the “Enfish claims” were patent eligible and “are directed to a specific improvement to the way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential table.”[19]  Further, the court refused to describe the “claims at such a high level of abstraction and untethered from the language of the claims.”[20]  It warned that defining the claims at such high level of abstraction “ensure[s] that the exceptions to §101 swallow the rule.”[21]

The court’s decision also concluded that the “improvement of an existing technology  is bolstered by the specification’s teachings that the claimed invention achieves other benefits over conventional databases, such as increased flexibility, faster search times, and smaller memory requirements.”[22]   It differentiated the Enfish claims from the claims in Alice and Versata, which could “readily be understood as simply adding conventional computer components to well-known business practices”[23]  In contrast, the Enfish claims are “directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality.”[24]

Lastly, even though the court did not reach step two of the Mayo/Alice test, it did recognize that should the question arise, courts should analyze “whether there are arguably concrete improvements in the recited computer technology [that] could take place under step two.”[25]

Conclusion

In reaching its conclusion in Enfish, the Court of Appeals goes a step further than the Mayo/Alice test and acknowledges the viability of software as well as other improvements in computer-related technologies as not necessarily “inherently abstract.”[26]  The question to ask in determining if the software improvements for so-called business methods passes step one of the Mayo/Alice is “whether the focus of the claims is on a specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities or, instead, on a process that qualifies as an ‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a tool.”[27]

[1] The information contained in this article does not constitute legal advice or legal opinion, but has been prepared for general information purposes only.  Any opinions expressed in this article shall not be construed to represent the legal opinion of this firm, its attorneys or any of its clients.  The receipt of this article does not create an attorney-client relationship.  ©2017 Wyatt & Associates, LLP.

[2] See Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (“‘[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable”).

[3] See Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International et. al., 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2358 (2014) (“Stating an abstract idea ‘while adding the words ‘apply it’ is not enough for patent eligibility.  Nor is limiting the use of an abstract idea ‘to a particular technological environment.  Stating an abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply combined those two steps, with a deficient result.”).

[4] Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

[5] Id. at 1330.

[6] Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d 1327, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also ADO.NET Overview, at https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/h43ks021(v=vs.110).aspx (“ADO.NET provides consistent access to data sources and data-sharing consumer applications to connect data sources.  ADO.NET allows users to connect to a database and manipulate data into individual or interdependent components.”).

[7] Microsoft® is a registered trademark of Microsoft Corporation.  Wyatt & Associates, LLP is not associated with Microsoft Corporation.

[8] U.S. Patent 6,163,775 (issued December 19, 2000) (emphasis added).

[9] 35 U.S.C.§101 (1999) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”).

[10] See Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

[11] Id. at 1335.

[12] Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354, 2360 (2014).

[13] See Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

[14] Id. (seeing “no reason to conclude that all claims directed to improvements in computer-related technology, including those directed to software, are abstract and necessarily analyzed at the second step of Alice, nor…[does] Alice so directs.”).

[15] Id. at 1334.

[16] Id. at 1335 (re-affirming the Court’s decision in which patent ineligible subject matter includes laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas).

[17] Id. at 1334.

[18] Id at 1335-1336.

[19] Id at 1336-1337 (“The district court concluded that the claims were directed to the abstract idea of ‘storing, organizing and retrieving memory in a logical table,’ or more simply, ‘the concept of organizing information using tabular formats.”).

[20] Enfish, LLC, 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016).

[21] Id. (noting from previous cases that it would “tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle” and cautioned “overgeneralizing claims” in making all patents unpatentable.).

[22] Id.

[23] Id. at 1338. (re-affirming the Supreme Court’s ruling in Versata  that claims are not patent eligible when the computer “perform[s] ‘purely conventional’ steps to carry out claims directed to the abstract idea….).

[24] Id. (“[t]he claims are directed to a specific implementation of a solution to a problem in the software arts.”).

[25] Id. at 1339.

[26] Id  at 1335.

[27] Id. at 1336 (emphasis added).

Curious How to Protect Your Fashion Designs? Trade Dress Law to the Rescue!

Kimberly R. Endelson[1]

It is often a question asked by fashion designers, “How do I protect my designs?”  Many understand that trademark law can protect their company’s brand name and logo, but are not aware of the options available for protecting the actual designs.  One option is through U.S. trademark law by registering for “trade dress,” and another option is through U.S. patent law by obtaining a design patent.

TRADE DRESS

Trademark law offers common law and federal protection for a word, symbol or phrase used by producers to identify their product.  Common law protection is obtained by using the mark in association with a product or service.  Federal protection can be obtained under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act[2] by applying for registration of a trademark through the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).

Trademark law can protect aspects of a product, such as trade dress.  According to Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., “[t]he ‘trade dress’ of a product is essentially its total image and overall appearance.”[3]  Trade dress may include product features such as “size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.”[4]

Trade dress is able to protect the visual characteristics of a product as long as those characteristics are distinctive.[5]  A mark can either be inherently distinctive or have acquired distinctiveness through use.  A mark is inherently distinctive and entitled to protection if its “intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product…”[6]  For example, the “square size, bright coloring, pebbled texture, polar bear and sunburst images” on the packaging of a Klondike®[7] ice cream bar was held to be inherently distinctive.[8]  A mark can also acquire distinctiveness, otherwise known as secondary meaning, by creating, through substantial or extended use, an association in the mind of the public between the mark and the goods or services the mark is identifying.[9]

In addition, trade dress can protect only non-functional product design.[10]  A product feature is functional and cannot serve as a trademark “if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost and quality of the article.”[11]

One is able to register a mark for trade dress through filing an application with the USPTO.  The application includes a drawing, a description of the mark, an identification of goods or services, and a specimen, if there is one.[12]

Trade dress may be used to protect not only the “dressing” or packaging of a product but also the design of a product[13] such as shoes,[14] handbags[15] and fabric patterns.[16]

Trade Dress Protection for Shoes

[17]

A recent case provides an example of how trade dress was used to protect a shoe design.  In Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent America Holding Inc., Christian Louboutin used trade dress law to protect the design of his red-soled shoes.[18]  In January 2008, the USPTO granted Christian Louboutin a trademark for his design and stated, “The color(s) red is/are claimed as a feature of the mark.  The mark consists of a lacquered red sole on footwear.”[19]  Then in 2011, Yves Saint Laurent prepared to market a line of monochrome shoes.  One of these shoes was entirely red, including the “upper” portion of the shoe and the bottom of the shoe called the “outsole.”  In 2011, Louboutin sued YSL in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming that YSL’s design infringed his trademark.  YSL replied that the Louboutin trademark was not valid.

In Louboutin, the District Court considered whether a single color may serve as a legally protected trademark, and in particular, as the mark for a particular style of high fashion women’s footwear.  The District Court held that a single color can never serve as a trademark in the fashion industry.[20]  The District Court stated, “Because in the fashion industry color serves ornamental and aesthetic functions vital to robust competition, the Court finds that Louboutin is unlikely to be able to prove that its red outsole brand is entitled to trademark protection, even if it has gained enough public recognition in the market to have acquired secondary meaning.”[21]

Louboutin appealed the lower court decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case to the District Court.  The Court of Appeals based its decision on the Supreme Court case Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products, Co., which held that a single color alone can serve as a trademark, as long as that color has acquired secondary meaning and identifies the brand.[22]  In making its determination of whether the red color on Louboutin’s shoes had acquired secondary meaning and identified the brand, the Court of Appeals examined factors such as the company’s advertising expenditures, media coverage and sales success.[23]  The Court of Appeals held that Louboutin’s signature red shoe sole had indeed acquired secondary meaning, saying it was a “symbol”[24] that had acquired secondary meaning and become “uniquely” associated with the brand.[25]  The court decided that trademark protection would extend only to designs in which the red sole (the “outsole”) contrasted with the color of the shoe (the “upper”).  The court stated that “the trademark, as thus modified, is entitled to trademark protection.”[26]

Trade Dress Protection for Handbags

[27]

Trade dress may also be used to protect the overall appearance or shape of a product, such as the shape of the Hermès®[28] Birkin®[29] handbag.  In Hermès International v. Emperia, Inc., the French luxury goods manufacturer Hermès International sought to use trade dress law to protect the design of one of their highly coveted handbags called the Birkin® handbag.  Hermès filed suit against Emperia, Inc., Anne-Sophie, Inc., and Top’s Handbag, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Central District of California for infringing on its trademark.[30]  Hermès had obtained a trademark through the USPTO on the shape of its Birkin® handbag, specifically on “the configuration of a handbag, having rectangular sides, a rectangular bottom, and a dimpled triangular profile” as well as on the top of the bag and the lock.[31]  Hermès was successful and the District Court permanently enjoined the defendants from manufacturing the infringing handbags.

Trade Dress Protection for Fabric Patterns

[32][33][34]

Trade dress may also protect a particular pattern, such as a pattern of cloth used as part of a product, as long as it serves to identify the source of the product.  For example, British luxury designer Burberry Limited uses trade dress law to distinguish their designs by incorporating their trademark check pattern[35] into different products.  The USPTO has granted Burberry Limited numerous trademark registrations for its trademark check pattern, stating that the mark has acquired distinctiveness.[36]  Thus it is arguable that over time, through sales and advertising, the company has created an association between the check pattern and the Burberry®[37] brand so that the pattern identifies the source of the product as Burberry.

It may be necessary to show secondary meaning when protecting your design mark.  Accordingly, before registering for the mark, it may be wise to consider how you or your company will market the product.  Trade dress protection may or may not be a viable option for an emerging designer depending on whether the designer can prove that the mark is well-recognized by consumers and one can show an association between the product and the brand.  An alternative option for an emerging designer or a well-established company that is coming out with a new product is to apply for a design patent.

[1] The information contained in this article does not constitute legal advice or legal opinion, but has been prepared for general informational purposes only. Any opinions expressed in this article shall not be construed to represent the legal opinion of this firm, its attorneys or any of its clients. The receipt of this article does not create an attorney-client relationship. ©2016 Wyatt & Associates, LLP

[2] 15 U.S.C. §1125(a) (1982).

[3] Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) (quoting Taco Cabana Int’l v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1118 (5th Cir. 1991)).

[4] Id. at 765 n.1 (quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)).

[5] Id. at 768.

[6] Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.

[7] Klondike® is a registered trademark of Conopco, Inc.

[8] Id. at 787, citing AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1536 11th Cir. 1986).

[9] Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-216 (2000) (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851, n.11 (1982)).

[10] Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982).

[11] TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).

[12] Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP), § 1202.02, April 2016.

[13] Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 209.

[14] Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 2012).

[15] Hermès Int’l v. Emperia, Inc., 14-CV-03522 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

[16] Burberry Limited’s Trademark Check Pattern: U.S Reg. No. 1,241,222 (registered June 7, 1983); U.S. Reg. No. 2,732,617 (registered July 1, 2003); U.S. Registration No. 2,022,789 (registered Dec. 17, 1996).

[17] United States Patent and Trademark Office, www.uspto.gov. U.S. Registration No. 3,361,597 (registered Jan. 1, 2008).

[18] See generally, Louboutin, 696 F. 3d 206.

[19] U.S. Registration No. 3,361,597 (Registered Jan. 1, 2008).

[20] Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 451, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

[21] Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 449.

[22] Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).

[23] Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 226.

[24] Id. at 227, see Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162.

[25] Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 226, see Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766 n.4.

[26] Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 212.

[27] United States Patent and Trademark Office, www.uspto.gov. U.S. Trademark Registration No. 3,936,105 (registered Mar. 29, 2011).

[28] Hermès® is a registered trademark of Hermès International.

[29] Birkin® is a registered trademark of Hermès International.

[30] Hermès International v. Emperia, Inc., 14-CV-03522 (C.D. Cal. 2014).

[31] U.S. Trademark Registration No. 3,936,105 (registered Mar. 29, 2011).

[32] United States Patent and Trademark Office, www.uspto.gov. U.S Reg. No. 1,241,222 (registered June 7, 1983).

[33] United States Patent and Trademark Office, www.uspto.gov. U.S. Reg. No. 2,732,617 (registered July 1, 2003).

[34] United States Patent and Trademark Office, www.uspto.gov. U.S Reg. No. 3,529,814 (registered Nov. 11, 2008).

[35] Burberry Limited’s Trademark Check Pattern: U.S Reg. No. 1,241,222 (registered June 7, 1983); U.S Reg. No. 2,022,789 (registered Dec. 17, 1996); U.S Reg. No. 1,855,154 (registered Sept. 20, 1994); U.S Reg. No. 2,015,462 (registered Nov. 12, 1996); U.S Reg. No. 2,689,921 (registered Feb. 25, 2003); U.S Reg. No. 2,845,852 (registered May 25, 2004); U.S Reg. No. 3,529,814 (registered Nov. 11, 2008); Burberry Limited’s Trademark Check Pattern (no color designation): U.S Reg. No. 2,612,272 (registered Aug. 27, 2002); U.S Reg. No. 2,732,617 (registered July 1, 2003); U.S Reg. No. 2,728,709 (registered Jan. 24, 2003).

[36] Id.

[37] Burberry® is a registered trademark of Burberry Limited.

What is Intellectual Property?

Intellectual Property (IP) refers to people’s creations, such as inventions, literary and artistic works, designs, symbols, names, and images used in commerce. Article 1, §8 of the United States Constitution and common law provide incentives for creators and inventors to create by giving them an exclusivity of rights so they can benefit from a competitive advantage in the marketplace. Such IP rights are protected by patent law, trademark law, copyright law, and trade secrets law.

Patent

A patent is a grant of property right for an invention to the inventor by the United States. An invention can be any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Presently, this also includes improvements to software processes. The grant of right allows the inventor to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing the invention for a period of 20 years from the date of application in the United States. By disclosing the invention, the inventor allows others to learn and improve the particular field of science.

Trademark

A trademark is a word, name, symbol, or image that is used on goods in commerce to show the source of the goods and distinguish the goods from that of others. Protection of the trademark is given to those who register and maintain the trademark with the USPTO. Such protection allows trademark owners to preserve the brand’s good will and fight against unfair competition, which include infringements.

Copyright

Copyrights protect “original works of authorship,” which include creative works such as literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and other published/unpublished works. Generally, copyrights allow the owners to have the exclusive right to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works, distribute copies/phonorecords of the work, and to perform or display the work publicly.

Trade Secrets

Trade secrets are protected and confidential ideas, which include manufacturing, industrial, or business/commercial secrets. Any unauthorized use of such information by a person constitutes unfair competition and that person can be prosecuted under commercial espionage, breach of contract, and breach of confidence laws.